The problem is that the behavorial sciences like psychiatry are not really sciences; they are semi-sciences. The underlying reality they describe is just not as regularized as the underlying reality of, say, a solar system.The psychiatrists and psychologists sometimes give the excuse that they have to deal with uncertainty, and can only speak in probabilities. But the truth is more nearly the opposite. Physicists talk about uncertainties and probabilities all the time. The psychology experts at the Jodi Arias trial never once gave a probability for anything.
As the handbook’s many critics have noted, psychiatrists use terms like “mental disorder” and “normal behavior,” but there is no agreement on what these concepts mean. When you look at the definitions psychiatrists habitually use to define various ailments, you see that they contain vague words that wouldn’t pass muster in any actual scientific analysis: “excessive,” “binge,” “anxious.”
Mental diseases are not really understood the way, say, liver diseases are understood, as a pathology of the body and its tissues and cells. Researchers understand the underlying structure of very few mental ailments. What psychiatrists call a disease is usually just a label for a group of symptoms. As the eminent psychiatrist Allen Frances writes in his book, “Saving Normal,” a word like schizophrenia is a useful construct, not a disease: “It is a description of a particular set of psychiatric problems, not an explanation of their cause.”
Furthermore, psychiatric phenomena are notoriously protean in nature. Medicines seem to work but then stop. Because the mind is an irregular cosmos, psychiatry hasn’t been able to make the rapid progress that has become normal in physics and biology. As Martin Seligman, a past president of the American Psychological Association, put it in The Washington Post early this year, “I have found that drugs and therapy offer disappointingly little additional help for the mentally ill than they did 25 years ago — despite billions of dollars in funding.” ...
If the authors of the psychiatry manual want to invent a new disease, they should put Physics Envy in their handbook. The desire to be more like the hard sciences has distorted economics, education, political science, psychiatry and other behavioral fields. It’s led practitioners to claim more knowledge than they can possibly have.
Friday, May 31, 2013
Brooks trashes DSM-5
NY Times columnist David Brooks writes about the DSM-5:
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Probability and Statistics employ the concept of distributions across populations describing events that can be consistently defined.
As David Brooks comments, "... psychiatrists use terms like “mental disorder” and “normal behavior,” but there is no agreement on what these concepts mean."
The uncertainty psychologists or psychiatrists deal with has nothing to do with a "disorder." Rather, the uncertainty has everything to do with whether any of their "colleagues" would come to the same diagnoses they arrive at!
American society has placed too much credence into these dangerous pseudo-scientists; there's a drug for every disorder. That's the real "disease."
Meanwhile, rest of the world just looks at us and laugh at how hedonistic a society we've become.
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